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NATIONAL ASBESTOS LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
MUST BE SOLVED
Courts throughout the United States are struggling with the seemingly
insurmountable number of asbestos-related personal injury claims.
Although the thousands of claims filed each year create overwhelmingly
backlogged court dockets,1 the current handling of asbestos-related liti-
gation has escalated to a "national scandal" 2 because courts have not
been able to agree on a workable solution to dispose of the claims eco-
nomically and fairly. This is not to suggest, however, that courts have
not proposed innovative means of adjudication.3 The most commonly
suggested solution is certification of a class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).1
Courts, although willing to allow certification of class actions under
1. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. The thousands of personal injury asbestos
lawsuits are concentrated primarily in coastal industrial areas. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass
Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
37 (1983).
2. 205 N.Y.LJ., Nov. 20, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
3. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The task will not be
easy;" there is a "need for innovative approaches"); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d
334, 348-52 (5th Cir. 1982) (sympathizing with caseload and encouraging trial court innovation);
Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1981) (calling for "new approaches to the
national tragedy of asbestos-related disease"). See also infra notes 37-92 and accompanying text for
a discussion of several innovative proposals.
4. Rule 23(b)(3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:... (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirabil-
ity of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Rule 23(a) sets out general prerequisites to maintenance of a class action:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (2) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repre-
sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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Rule 23(b)(3) for property damage caused by asbestos,5 for personal inju-
ries and property damage caused by contaminated water,6 and for Agent
Orange plaintiffs,7 have refused to approve such certification for asbestos-
related personal injuries.'
This Note examines the possibility of and problems with certifying a
class of personal injury asbestos claimants under Rule 23(b)(3) and sug-
gests what can and should be done to resolve the difficulties. Part I re-
views the history of the commercial use of asbestos, the dangers
associated with such use, and the resulting burden on court dockets.
Part II discusses judicial attempts to address the increasing need for eco-
nomical means to confront "toxic torts" to reduce backlogged dockets.
Part III examines class certification requirements under Rule 23(b)(3) as
applied to the characteristics of a typical "class" of asbestos claimants.
Part IV, while concluding that class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), as
it now reads, is inappropriate for asbestos plaintiffs, suggests that courts
cannot continue to resolve the problem claim by claim. Accordingly,
Part IV proposes that Congress enact a federal solution that would create
different class action requirements specifically tailored for personal inju-
ries arising from asbestos exposure.
I. THE COMMERCIAL USES AND DANGERS OF ASBESTOS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES COURT SYSTEM
Asbestos has been used for insulation since 1866. 9 In 1874 it became
available commercially.10 Although scientists did not publicize widely
the dangers of asbestos until the 1960s, they recognized that it caused
asbestosis as early as 1924.11 However, even after manufacturers recog-
nized the danger, they failed to warn adequately those in high-risk
5. See In re Asbestos School Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See also infra notes
115-18 and accompanying text.
6. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). See also infra notes
143-47 and accompanying text.
7. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Diamond
Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). See also infra
notes 128-31, 135, 149-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 60-77, 121-27 and accompanying text.
9. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973) (medical
testimony), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
10. Id.
11. Note, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases? Manville's Chapter
11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENvrL. L. 465, 468 (1984).
[Vol. 69:899
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fields.' 2 Since 1940 more than twenty-one million Americans have been
exposed to asbestos in the workplace.13 Each year, tens of thousands of
people become ill or die from diseases related to asbestos.14
The three most common diseases that asbestos can cause are asbesto-
sis,15 lung cancer, 6 and mesothelioma.' 7 Asbestos-related lung diseases
12. Id. The federal government, the largest buyer of asbestos, knew of the dangers and, like the
manufacturers, failed to provide warnings. Id. Comment, Relieffor Asbestos Victims: A Legislative
Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 179, 193 n.114 (1983). Unlike the American government, the
British government recognized and acted on the early studies regarding asbestos health hazards. In
1933, the British government restricted the amount of asbestos dust permissible in the workplace.
Id. Consequently, Britain has experienced a far lower degree of asbestos-related disease than has the
United States. Id.
The United States government may have failed to warn because it employed over four million
people who were exposed to asbestos while working in naval shipyards during World War II. Note,
supra note 11, at 468. See also Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1980: Hearings on S.
2847 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings on S. 2847] (statement of Sen. Gary Hart). The United States government was a large
buyer and user of asbestos; until 1969, it was the largest asbestos user in the country. Anderson,
Warshaver & Coffin, The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act A Legislative Solution to a
Litigation Crisis, 10 J. LEGIS. 25, 29, 38-39 (1983).
Although the Federal Government knew of the health hazards posed by asbestos use, it not only
failed to warn, but actually established a requirement that all Navy ships use asbestos as an insula-
tor. Comment, supra, at 194. According to one commentator, the only explanation the government
provided was that the Navy wanted to avoid implementing any restriction on production rates. Id.
at 195.
Not until the 1960s did the United States Government set forth regulations protecting American
workers from asbestos. Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 55, 56 (1978). Although a step in the right direction, the standards established are di-
rected towards asbestosis only; they provide insufficient protection against cancer. Id. at 56-57. See
infra notes 15-17 for a discussion of the three most prevalent asbestos-related diseases.
13. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). Environmental contact has
exposed several million more people to this hazardous substance. Additionally, workers who have
been in contact with asbestos have exposed their relatives to the dangerous fibers. Id.
14. Note, supra note 11, at 466-67. The Department of Health and Human Services estimates
that, since the commencement of World War II, eight to eleven million workers have been exposed
to asbestos. Hearings on S.2847, supra note 12, at 169. Four million workers have suffered
"heav[y]" exposure to asbestos. Id. The Department of Health and Human Services expects that
35-45%, or 1.6 million, of those workers will die of asbestos-related diseases. Id. Another estimate
predicts that as many as 2.15 million Americans will die from asbestos exposure. NATIONAL CAN-
CER INSTITUTE AND NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCES, ESTIMATES
OF FRACTION OF CANCER INCIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES ATrRIBUTABLE TO OCCUPATIONAL
FACTORS 1-2 (Draft Summary, 1978).
15. Inhaling asbestos dust causes asbestosis. Even minimal exposure in an industrial setting
can cause the disease. Once individuals inhale asbestos fibers, the fibers settle in their lungs. This
causes a progressive and apparently irreversible tissue reaction. Because asbestosis has a latency
period of between 10-25 years, early detection or diagnosis is difficult. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973) (medical testimony), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974). See also Note, supra note 11, at 466-68 (citing Selikoff, Chung & Hammond, The Occurance
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are different from most on-the-job injuries because they are not immedi-
ately detectable."8 The lengthy latency periods between exposure and de-
tection make it extremely difficult to discern the asbestos source that
caused a particular worker's disease.' 9
Since many of the victims seek legal redress for their injuries, the
courts are experiencing an "avalanche" 2 of asbestos-related litigation.
Asbestos has become the most frequent subject of products liability suits
in the United States, surpassing litigation generated by Agent Orange,
DES, and the Dalkon Shield.2' Currently, 29,466 federal cases and ap-
proximately 60,000 state cases are pending in the United States.22 The
end is not in sight. Due to the diseases' lengthy latency periods, potential
of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in the United States, 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sc, 139
(1965)).
16. Inhaling asbestos fibers also can cause lung cancer, or bronchogenic carcinoma, which com-
mences in the lung's upper areas, is more common among workers who smoke cigarettes, and, like
asbestosis, has a long latency period. Note, supra note 11, at 468.
17. Inhaling asbestos fibers also can cause mesothelioma. Either the lung lining or the pleural
and peritoneal cavities, surrounding the gastrointestinal tract organ, suffers a malignant tumor.
Although detection of mesothelioma usually is delayed, it can emerge only several months after
exposure to the asbestos fibers. Id. at 468-69. See also Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667
F.2d 1034, 1038 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
18. Note, supra note 11, at 468-69.
19. Id. at 467. Moreover, since the number of asbestos fibers inhaled directly affects the degree
of harm suffered, it is sometimes difficult to discern the degree of risk individual products pose.
Ingram, Insurance Coverage Problems in Latent Disease and Injury Cases, 12 ENVTL. L. 317, 325
(1982). At one end of the spectrum, bonded products such as linoleum do not pose a health hazard
unless broken. Id. at 319. Spray asbestos insulators, which release numerous fibers into the air, are
at the other end of the spectrum. Id. at 324. In the middle are thousands of products whose level of
potential harm is unknown. Such uncertainty further hinders the determination of causation. Id. at
324-25. Another commentator concludes, however, that just a single exposure to asbestos could
cause harm. 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SC., CANCER AND THE WORKER 34 (1977).
20. Note, supra note 11, at 468.
21. Id. See also Hearings on S. 2847, supra note 12, at 170.
22. See In re National Asbestos Litig., Cleveland Div., No. 1-90 Cv 11,000 (Aug. 10, 1990).
These figures reflect the Federal Judicial Center's findings. According to other figures, an estimated
175,000 asbestos cases currently fill court dockets. 12 Nat'l L.J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 3, col. 1. The
cases are not, however, evenly distributed among the courts. There are approximately 10,000 cases
each pending before Judges Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York, Lambros of the North-
ern District of Ohio, and Parker of the Eastern District of Texas. Id.
In Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge
Parker's class certification of approximately 900 asbestos claimants. Id. Some of the remaining
4,100 suits filed were settled, leaving approximately 3,031 personal injury cases in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas alone. 12 Nat'l L.J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 3, col. 1. Judge Parker concluded that if the
cases in the Eastern District of Texas were tried in groups of 10, the litigation would fill the district
court's docket for a full three years, leaving no time for any other matters. In re Fibreboard Corp.,
893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1990).
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plaintiffs will continue to file claims at an alarming rate for years to
come.
23
Claim-by-claim adjudication adversely affects not only the court dock-
ets but the actual claimants as well.24 Plaintiffs often are forced to wait
for up to seven years to go to trial.25 Once they get to court, the plaintiffs
face inconsistent jury verdicts and awards that take on "aspects of a lot-
tery."' 26  Families experiencing profound difficulty, having established
with near certainty a "substantial amount of fault,"27 receive absolutely
nothing, while other claimants who have not established as high a
probability of liability recover large amounts.28 In addition, the amount
of physical pain suffered by different plaintiffs bears little relation, if any
at all, to the size of the awards.29
II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE CRISIS OF INUNDATED
COURT DOCKETS
In the last fifteen years mass tort litigation has inundated the courts.30
Mass tort litigation encompasses both mass accidents and mass products
liability.3 Distinguishing between the two is important because the Ad-
visory Committee's Note to the 1966 Revision of Rule 23(b)(3) refers
only to the former.32 The Advisory Committee warns that normally
23. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs will file an
estimated 180,000 additional claims, excluding those for property damage, by 2010. In re School
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1986).
Other factors shed light on an increased litigation rate. As life expectancy rates increase, potential
victims will have more time to discover the diseases. Furthermore, researchers may discover more
diseases linked to asbestos exposure. The publicizing of high jury awards increases awareness and
the likelihood that people will bring claims. Finally, the expansion of compensation eligibility to
third parties, such as spouses, will add to the rate of claims filed. Zeman, The Asbestos Crsis:
Thoughts on Proposed Solutions, 34 FIc. Q. 375, 377-78 (1984).
24. Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 470.
25. Id.
26. 205 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1991, at I, col. 5 (quoting Judge Weinstein).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Judge Weinstein observed that the 64 federal cases tried before him during a five month
trial yielded unpredictable and inconsistent jury verdicts. The mesothelioma cases, involving high
degrees of pain and incapacity, yielded lower verdicts than the pleural cases, which involved minimal
incapacity. As another example of the inconsistencies plaguing the asbestos litigation, Judge Wein-
stein contrasted a Virgin Islands case that resulted in a $26 million verdict with 20 defense verdicts
returned by courts in the Southern District of New York. Id.
30. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
31. Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324 n.1 (1983).
32. Id. The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Revision of Rule 23(b)(3) provides:
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mass accidents are inappropriate for class action.33 Although many
courts remain hesitant to ignore the constraints suggested in the Advi-
sory Committee's Note and consequently are reluctant to certify class
actions for mass accidents,3 4 several note that the Advisory Committee's
Note neither mentions nor pertains to class certification of mass torts. 35
Thus, some courts have acknowledged the increasing need for economi-
cal means to confront the "toxic torts" to reduce the backlogged and
repetitive dockets confronting the judicial system.36  Courts have certi-
fied Rule 23(b)(3) classes, proposed innovative variations of class certifi-
cation, grouped claims in a series of trials, and used reverse bifurcation.
The class action device is foremost among these "economical
means." 37 As the dissagreement between courts indicates, there are both
positive and negative implications of the class action procedure in toxic
tort cases.38  The benefits of class action include increased court effi-
ciency,39 lower court costs,' and decreased judicial boredom from repet-
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate
for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages
but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in differ-
ent ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would
degenerate into multiple law suits separately tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
33. Id. Arguments against class certification for mass accidents include 10th amendment con-
siderations, Erie Doctrine implications, and due process concerns. Williams, supra note 31, at 324
n.l.
34. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield, Etc., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Central Dist. of
California, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 911 (1976); In re Three Mile Island
Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
35. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468,473 (5th Cir. 1986); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009
(3rd Cir. 1986); In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1067 (1984). See also Williams, supra note 31, at 324 n.1 (drawing a distinction between mass
accidents and mass torts in the product liability context).
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 93-157 for discussion of problems with certifying a class of asbestos
claimants.
38. See infra notes 60-77, 115-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of district courts'
innovative efforts being vacated on appeal.
39. Rule 23(b)(3) is "the fairest and most efficient method available to dispose of... claims."
Williams, supra note 31, at 326. Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and class action for single-issue
adjudication under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) encourage settlement and, consequently, save both money and
time. Id. at 328. To buttress his conclusion, Judge Williams requested that the Chief Clerk of the
District Court for the Northern District of California prepare a report calculating the amount of
judicial time and resources saved by settlements induced by class certification in a mass product
liability tort action. The report disclosed that if 90% of the 1000 class members settled their cases-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/9
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itive litigation."1 The advantage for successful plaintiffs is that the
procedure assures them compensation.42 Likewise, the procedure assures
the defendant a final judgment and an ascertainable financial cost.43 If
litigation proceeds on an individual plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis, however,
high punitive damage awards may force the defendant into bankruptcy.'
If the defendant goes bankrupt, it is likely that the next plaintiff who
seeks damages after the bankruptcy will go uncompensated.45
the normal percentage of settlement-the parties would save $26 million in court costs, and the
court would save seven million dollars. Id.
40. Id.
41. Judge Williams rhetorically demands, "[i]s it effective or efficient use of limited judicial
resources to subject a judge to the tedious and frustrating task of presiding over identical lawsuits?"
Williams, supra note 31, at 325. Judge Williams certified a class of Dalkon Shield plaintiffs under
Rule 23(bX3). However, the court of appeals vacated his order. In re Northern Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield, Etc. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
A judge forced by the system to face the boredom of repetitive case-by-case adjudication may
become mechanical in his resolution of issues, frustrated with his job, and less productive and imagi-
native in carrying out his important duties.
42. If the courts proceed with a trial-by-trial adjudication of the asbestos claims, the first 100
plaintiffs may be compensated for their injuries, but the 10 1st may be unable to recover if the defend-
ant company no longer has sufficient funds. When Manville filed for bankruptcy, Judge Weinstein
ordered the company to establish the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust to pay asbestos
claimants. The trustees, however, administered the trust on a first-come, first-served basis and, con-
sequently, the trust ran out of funds. Wall. St. J., Nov. 6, 1990, at B12, col. 2. The Manville Trust
later announced a plan that provided for increased recovery. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1990, at DI, col.
3. See also infra note 43.
43. For example, under the current Eagle-Pitcher class action settlement plan involving 65,000
asbestos cases before Judge Weinstein, the company is, in effect, receiving a "blanket guarantee" that
litigation over the asbestos matter will cease and consequently, that the plan will protect the com-
pany from further adverse court actions. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1990, at D2, col. 3.
The proposed Eagle-Pitcher plan separates asbestos victims into two categories. Level I victims
are those with more serious illnesses such as mesothelioma. These claimants will receive compensa-
tion during the first two years of the plan, while level II claimants will begin to receive compensation
in the third year. The plan will compensate the more serious level II claimants before those with
minor injuries. Id. Such a plan benefits both the defendants and the plaintiffs. It assures the defend-
ants a final judgment while it compensates the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs are dissatisfied with
the 20 year, $750 million plan, which would compensate both present and future claimants. On
appeal, they are likely to challenge Judge Weinstein's authority to settle cases from other federal and
state courts. Wall. St. J., Nov. 6, 1990, at B12, col. 2.
Class action suits also allow defendants to predict more precisely the results of a litigated matter
so as to price products accordingly. McGovern, Management of Multiple Toxic Tort Litigation:
Case Law and Trends Affecting Management, 19 FORUM 1, 8 (1983). This, in turn, like the Eagle-
Pitcher solution, would benefit the company's shareholders. Wall. St. J., Nov. 9, 1990, at C2, col. 4.
44. On the other hand, like the Manville Corporation, the corporation may attempt to use the
Bankruptcy Code as a shield from liability. Note, supra note 11, at 465.
45. See supra notes 42-43. The Wellington Facility provides an alternative remedy. Dean Wel-
lington of the Yale University Law School created the facility, funded by asbestos producers, to
resolve asbestos-related claims. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 473 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Several factors, however, mitigate against the use of the class action as
a means to resolve toxic torts. In a large case in which awards may be
high, each plaintiff has an interest in controlling his own case46 and in
choosing his own representation. 7 Additionally, plaintiffs with different
degrees and types of injuries, different medical backgrounds, and differ-
ent types and durations of exposure often lack the Rule 23(b)(3) com-
monality requirement.48
One innovative approach breaks the class action into four trial
phases:49 1) a consolidated trial to try common defenses and punitive
damages; 2) a determination both of how many plaintiffs were exposed
to each defendant's products and the amount of actual damages; 3) an
apportionment of damages; and 4) a distribution of damages. District
Court Judge Robert Parker approved of this suggestion in In re
Fibreboard Corp. 50
46. The plaintiffs' lawyers usually are the traditional opponents to class treatment for mass tort
litigation. Williams, supra note 31, at 329. They argue that class action is appropriate for matters in
which claimants, faced with either evidentiary problems or a small recovery, otherwise would not
sue. They argue that because the asbestos litigation involves large sums of recovery, the class action
device is inappropriate. However, this argument is weakened by the Rule 23 requirement that each
member of the class have a claim for more than $50,000. Id. See Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (in diversity actions, "each plaintiff in [a] Rule 23(b)(3) class action must
satisfy the jurisdictional amount"). Moreover, the primary purpose of Rule 23 is to promote judicial
economy. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
47. Since the requirements for class certification include adequate representation, this argument
is somewhat specious. Plaintiffs' attorneys usually make this argument as well as the argument that
a plaintiff has a right to control his own case, see supra note 46. Williams, supra note 31, at 329.
48. See infra notes 105-36 and accompanying text.
49. In Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), Professor Jack Ratliff, as
special master, recommended such a four-phase approach to tackle the asbestos litigation problem.
See also In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1990).
Another variation of the class device consolidates the actions. In August 1990, Judge Parker of
the Eastern District of Texas and Judge Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio signed an order
calling for the consolidation of Texas and Ohio class actions with the New York cases before Judge
Weinstein, the latter to the extent that courts could join fact finding and appoint experts. Eight
other U.S. district court judges approved the order. In re National Asbestos Litig., Cleveland Div.,
1-90 Cv 11,000 (Aug. 10, 1990). However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals immediately criticized
Judge Lambros for attempting to exercise jurisdiction over cases from Texas. In re Allied-Signal,
Inc., 915 F.2d 190-191 (6th Cir. 1990). Subsequently, Judge Lambros vacated his earlier order. In
re Ohio Asbestos Litig., OAL Order No. 102 (Aug. 20, 1990).
50. 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (referring to several pretrial orders by Judge Parker). How-
ever, in Fibreboard, the Fifth Circuit granted the defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus, find-
ing that approving the use of Phase II was beyond the district court's power. Id. at 711.
Even while vacating Judge Parker's order for a Phase II trial, the Fifth Circuit sympathized with
the difficulties the district court confronted and encouraged the court to "continue its imaginative
and innovative efforts to confront these cases." Id. at 712.
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Phase I consists of one consolidated trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 42(a), 1 by which common defenses and punitive dam-
ages are tried. 52 During this phase the jury determines many factual is-
sues: which insulated products contained asbestos capable of causing
harm; which of the defendants' products were marketed defectively;
which of the defendants' products were unreasonably dangerous; when
did each defendant know or have reason to know that workers and their
families were at risk of sustaining an asbestos-related injury; and whether
each defendant's marketing of such products amounted to gross
negligence.53
In Phase II, the jury determines the percentage of the plaintiffs ex-
posed to each defendant's products and the percentage of the plaintiffs'
claims barred by affirmative defenses such as statutes of limitation and
adequate warnings.54 In this phase the jury estimates the actual damages
for each type of disease. 5" Judge Parker proposed having a complete trial
with eleven class representatives for jury determination.56 Furthermore,
the parties could introduce evidence from thirty illustrative plaintiffs
chosen by both the plaintiffs and the defendants.57 From the forty-one
plaintiffs' testimony and expert testimony introduced by both parties, the
jury would determine the remaining class members' damages. 58  In
Phases III and IV the court apportions and distributes damages.59
In In re Fibreboard Corp. , the Fifth Circuit refused to enlarge its
prior decision in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 61 In Jenkins, the
court held that bifurcation to determine the punitive and actual damages
was constitutional and fair to the defendants, as long as the court alerted
the jury to the fact that the unnamed plaintiffs' claims were not actually
51. Rule 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it
may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
52, 893 F.2d at 708.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 708-09.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 709.
57 Id.
58. Id. at 709. In Fibreboard, 2990 class members remained after settlements. Id.
59. Id. at 708. Neither Phase III nor Phase IV posed a problem for the Fibreboard court. Id.
60. Id. at 706.
61. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
908 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
proven and that, as a result, their injuries might differ from those of the
illustrative plaintiffs.62
The Fibreboard court held that Phase II of Judge Parker's proposed
trial was an abuse of discretion that resulted in substantive changes in
Texas state law, contrary to the Erie Doctrine,63 and that it infringed
upon the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative
branches."4
The Fibreboard court found that, in creating its products liability law,
the Texas legislature had made its public policy choice.65 Texas law dic-
tated that a plaintiff, in order to sue successfully a manufacturer or sup-
plier, must prove both causation and damage.66 The court viewed these
requirements as indicative of the legislature's intent that courts focus on
individuals rather than on groups.6 7 The court found that Judge Parker's
scheme would determine the individual claims of 2,990 persons (exclud-
ing the forty-one individual cases tried) without the claims being
presented to the jury.68 Instead, the jury would determine these claims
based on group consideration.69 Thus, under such a scheme, manufac-
turers might face possible liability for 2,990 cases whose claims were not
actually tried.7°
The court found that in addition to infringing on the state legislature's
policy choices, such a procedure would result in a substantive change in
the nature of the traditional trial, a result contrary to the Erie Doc-
trine.71 Recognizing that Phase II appears to propose procedural, rather
than substantive innovations, the court stated that the use of expert testi-
mony regarding the unnamed plaintiffs is a "change ... in substantive
duty.., dressed as a change in procedure."'72 Thus, the court concluded
62. Id. at 474. The bifurcation procedure employed by the Jenkins court was similar to Phase I
proposed by Judge Parker in In re Fibreboard. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
63. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply the laws of the state in which they are situated).
64. 893 F.2d at 711.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. I1d.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. To emphasize this point, the court noted previously observed changes in trial dynamics
caused by expert testimony. Id. at 711. The court admitted that judges have "considerable" experi-
ence with mathematical constructs of trials. The court also noted that Phase II would reduce the
trial to expert testimony regarding the claims of 2,990 plaintiffs. Id. at 710.
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that although Phase II attempts to achieve "commonality" of causation
and damages issues among the class,7 3 it contradicts state law by focusing
on general rather than individual causation.74 The court, however, ac-
knowledged the compelling argument that Phase II is the only realistic
means of trying such a large number of cases, but suggested that the issue
should be addressed by either congressional or state legislative action.75
Finally, the court addressed the requirement of predominance of com-
mon questions of law or fact.76 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
diseases, exposure periods, and lifestyles are too diverse to meet this
requirement.77
After the Fibreboard decision, Judge Parker continued his "coura-
geous and innovative ' 78 attempts to remedy the asbestos litigation crisis
by adopting a different approach. He tried the claims of 147 plaintiffs in
three different trials. 79 The first jury heard ten cases and returned a ver-
dict establishing liability. 0 Three months later, in July 1990, two juries
heard 160 randomly selected cases in groups of ten to twenty and deter-
mined in sealed verdicts damages for different categories of illnesses.81 In
October 1990 the court unsealed the verdicts 2 and the plaintiffs received
$122 million.83 The court of appeals has not yet ruled on this trial
method.
New York Supreme Court Justice Helen Freedman has employed re-
73. See infra notes 105-36.
74. 893 F.2d at 711-12. Rather than proving that defendant A's asbestos caused plaintiff A's
disease, Phase II could only prove that, in most cases, defendant A's asbestos would have caused
plaintiff A's injury. Id. at 712.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also supra note 4.
77. 893 F.2d at 712. The court failed, however, to observe that having trials with different
phases can encourage settlement, thereby not only reducing the court's time and resources, but also
assuring the plaintiffs of compensation and the defendants of a final lump sum owed. See supra
notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
78. Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1990, at B13, col. 2.
79. Id. (referring to Judge Parker's approach in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. Tex. 1990)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court probably will reduce the $122 million to take into account various settle-
ments. However, the court may increase the figure by adding both prejudgment interest and puni-
tive damages. The defense attorneys promise to appeal both the damages awarded and the
procedures used to reach the damages. Henry Gerrard, counsel for Pittsburg Corning, one of the
three remaining defendants, stated that "we believe there is no law anywhere that supports what he's
doing." Id. The other two defendants are Celotex and Fibreboard. Id.
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verse bifurcation, another innovative procedure, to handle approximately
190 Navy Yard asbestos cases." The 190 cases consist only of those
claims in which plaintiffs allege that 100% of their exposure to asbestos
occurred at the Navy Yards. 5 In the first trial under this non-traditional
structure, the plaintiffs must prove only that exposure to some asbestos
product caused their injuries.86 Based on this, the jury assesses dam-
ages. 7 The second trial, before the same jury, disposes of liability is-
sues.8" To minimize the time spent on the first trial, Judge Freedman
ordered the plaintiffs to choose thirty-five representative cases.8 9 This
plan will induce settlement after the first trial because once the jury ar-
rives at a damage figure, the parties will know what type of costs they
confront.90 If the jury returns a large damage award, the defendants will
be more willing to settle.9" On the other hand, if the jury returns a low
figure, this will encourage the plaintiffs to "cut their losses."92
84. 205 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1991, at 1, col. 1. New York rules of civil procedure give judges
broad discretion in establishing the "sequence" of trial issues to "achieve a speedy and unprejudiced
disposition." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4011 (Consol. 1978).
85. 204 N.Y.LJ., Oct. 15, 1990, at 3, col. 3. Judge Freedman handled only the state claims. In
the meantime, Judge Weinstein, in a traditional trial, disposed of the federal claims of those plaintiffs
claiming 100% exposure to asbestos from the Navy Yards. The remaining plaintiffs, with claims of
90% or less exposure from the Navy Yards, will litigate their claims later. Id. Judge Weinstein has
called the handling of these 576 asbestos cases "the last great battle of World War II." N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1990, at D2, col. 4. In January 1991, after four weeks of deliberation, the jury returned a
verdict of $36 million for 52 federal plaintiffs. 205 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1991, at 1, col. 5.
Originally, in June 1990, the two judges announced their plan to adjudicate the cases in an unprec-
edented joint federal-state trial. This announcement resulted in 18 out of 24 defendants reaching
settlements by early September. However, the judges abandoned this unorthodox idea. Id.
86. 204 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 3, col. 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court expects the first round of the reverse bifurcated procedure to last at least two
months. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. One might query why the parties endure a two-month first trial when they expect to
settle without going through the second trial. The largest impediment to settlement is the uncer-
tainty of how a jury will view asbestos-related injuries. Id. Prior verdicts reveal that juries are
unpredictable. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Such verdict disparity is apparent
from the outcomes of the Navy Yard cases. The state verdicts averaged $2 million per plaintiff,
while the federal verdict averaged $590,000. 205 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1991, at 1, col. 5.
The defendants, dissatisfied with the reverse bifurcation procedure, unsuccessfully appealed. The
defendants argue that it is unfair to "force" a settlement based only on damage figures without
having the plaintiffs prove causation. 204 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 4. One defense attorney
surmised that because the court resolved the issue of asbestos exposure in the first trial, the jury in
the second trial will be unlikely to pay much attention to product identification because "they have
already decided that someone's product has caused the injury." Id. Another defense attorney com-
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III. THE PROBLEMS OF CERTIFYING A CLASS OF ASBESTOS
CLAIMANTS PURSUANT TO RULE 23(B)(3)
The class action conserves "the resources of both the courts and the
parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member]
to be litigated in an economical fashion." 93 To ensure that the class ac-
tion achieves this purpose, plaintiffs seeking certification must fulfill cer-
tain requirements established by Rule 23(a):94 numerosity, 95 typicality,96
adequacy of representation, 97 and the existence of questions of fact or law
common to members of the class.98 Once the plaintiffs meet these crite-
ria, the "class" must meet two additional requirements to gain class certi-
fication under Rule 23(b)(3). First, questions of law or fact common to
the class members must predominate over questions affecting individual
members.99 Second, a class action must be superior to other methods of
adjudication."°°
In determining whether the class meets the latter two requirements,
the courts consider four factors: 1) the plaintiffs' interest in individually
controlling the litigation;1 ' 2) other pending litigation;10 2 3) the desira-
plained that the first trial is pro-plaintiff because the jury hears "one tale of woe after another"
without hearing any mitigating evidence. Id.
93. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 456 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
94. The party seeking class certification has the burden of proving that his case fulfills the
requirements of Rule 23. Id. at 156. See supra note 4 for text of Rule 23(a).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(aX1).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(aX3). Typicality focuses more on the similarity of the legal and reme-
dial theories underlying the plaintiffs' claims than on the strengths of the cases themselves. Jenkins
v Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422,
429 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Different fact patterns or damage amounts will not necessarily defeat typical-
ity. See Joseph v. General Motors Corp., 109 F.R.D. 635, 640-41 (D. Col. 1986). See also Sala v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Texas Int'l Sec. Litig., 114
F.R.D. 33, 44 (W.D. Okl. 1987).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(aX4). Both the class representatives and their counsel must be "ade-
quate" representatives. The representative's stake in the litigation may not conflict with the un-
named class members' interests. See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 472; In re Asbestos School Litig., 104
F.R.D. at 431-32. Furthermore, the court will consider the attorney's past experience both in class
actions and in the particular type of litigation under analysis. Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 472.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(aX2 ). "The threshold of commonality is not high." Jenkins, 782 F.2d
at 472. In order to satisfy this requirement, the adjudication of the common questions must affect
all, or a substantial portion of, the class members. Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 (5th Cir.
1982).
99. See supra note 4 for text of Rule 23.
100. Id.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3XA).
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
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bility of concentrating the litigation in a particular forum;10 3 and 4) the
difficulties which may emerge in managing the class action."t 4
Normally, plaintiffs in toxic tort cases easily satisfy Rule 23(a)'s first
three requirements. Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(a)'s fourth requirement
have generated the current problems and debate.
A. Commonality
Generally, "commonality" requires that the facts to be proven be com-
mon to all of the class members, rather than to all of the defendants.105
The composition of a "typical" class of asbestos claimants makes meeting
the standard commonality requirement very difficult.
The "class" might include insulation workers, construction workers,
pipe-coverers, asbestos workers' survivors and household members 10 6
seeking monetary damages for asbestos-related injury, disease or
death.'017 Usually, the class would consist of persons claiming to suffer
from asbestosis (both pleural and pulmonary), 08 lung cancer' 9 and
mesothelioma 110 due to varying periods of exposure to different prod-
ucts.111 The dates that the plaintiffs knew or should have known of their
exposure to asbestos products may vary.' 2 Furthermore, for various
reasons, not all plaintiffs may have legal claims against all defendants." 3
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires that a common question predominate. Merely having a
claim against the same defendant will not suffice. Id.
106. For example, if a ship yard worker arrives home after having worked with asbestos prod-
ucts, his clothes almost certainly will contain asbestos dust. Anyone who comes into contact with
the dust on the clothes will be exposed to the asbestos and may develop asbestos-related illnesses.
Mehaffey, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 15 FORUM 341, 351 (1980).
107. In re Fibreboard Corp. 893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1990).
108. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
111. 893 F.2d at 710. Moreover, certain unrelated substances can cause asbestos related dis-
eases. For instance, in considering the causes of lung cancer, an individual's smoking, diet, and
alcohol consumption must be factored in. Domopoulos, Summary of Conference: Major Discussion
Points and Societal Interrelationships, 3 J. ENVTL. PATHOLOGY & TOxICOLOGY 42-74 (March
1983). Surprisingly, scientists reveal that tap water in many cities contains asbestos-type minerals.
Craighead & Mossman, Asbestos-Associated Disease, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1446 (1982). Such
considerations further complicate the causation problem.
112. 893 F.2d at 710.
113. Id. Causation, though, will not necessarily present a problem for the plaintiff. In Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), the
Fifth Circuit held that an insulation worker who could pinpoint 11 asbestos manufacturers who
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/9
1991] NATIONAL ASBESTOS LITIGATION
However, the commonality requirement does not inevitably defeat
class certification. Courts vary in the degree of flexibility which they
grant the "class" in meeting this requirement. Furthermore, in order to
expedite litigation, some courts have certified class actions to determine a
single issue under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 114
The Courts of Appeal for the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits
have held that toxic torts are suitable for civil class action treatment. In
In re School Asbestos Litigation, I the Third Circuit, in affirming Rule
23(b)(3) certification, quickly acknowledged numerosity, typicality, and
adequacy of representation, and focused on the requirement that ques-
tions of law or fact be common to the class. 1 6 The court noted that
asbestos cases involve almost identical evidence pertaining to the health
hazards of asbestos, to the defendants' knowledge of those dangers, fail-
ure to warn or test, and to concert of action or conspiracy in both form-
ing and following industry practices.' 1 7 The court acknowledged that
the causation problems in a property damage case are more straightfor-
ward than in one involving personal injury. 18 The court's reluctance to
decertify the class, however, was due largely to the "highly unusual na-
ture of asbestos litigation."'1 9 The court was hesitant to foreclose a pos-
produced the products to which he was exposed could hold the manufacturers jointly and severally
liable. Id. In other jurisdictions the plaintiff need not show cause-in-fact. The probability that a
manufacturer caused exposure to a dangerous product may suffice for liability. See Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cerL denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979). Given the nature both of asbestos
and of the consequences of exposure to asbestos, other barriers to recovery exist. Due to the long
manifestation period, a statute of limitations that begins at exposure rather than discovery may bar
the suit. Comment, supra note 12, at 77. Defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory
negligence also may bar recovery. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1096-98
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
In In re Fibreboard, for instance, the Fifth Circuit rejected certification of a class consisting of 907
plaintiffs suffering from pleural cases, 1184 from asbestosis, 219 from lung cancer, 92 from "other"
cancers, and 33 from Mesothelioma. The court saw other potential problems in that some class
members may have been barred from bringing claims against one of the defendants because of prior
employment with the company, and some members may not have had legal claims against the de-
fendants. Furthermore, not all of the plaintiffs suffered injuries by way of the act, omission, conduct,
or fault of all the defendants. Finally, the members of the class had varying types of injury.
Fibreboard, 893 F.2d at 710.
114. Rule 23(cX4XA) provides: "When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or main-
tained as a class action with respect to particular issues... " FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
115. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 1002.
117. Id. at 1009.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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sibly workable method of disposing of the plaintiffs' claims.120
The Third Circuit quoted 121 with approval the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 122 In Jenkins, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed Judge Parker's Rule 23(b)(3) certification of a "mass tort" class
action involving many plaintiffs with diverse asbestos-related claims.1
23
The court found commonality in the fact that the defendants planned to
raise the "state of the art" defense against all of the plaintiffs.124 Evi-
dence concerning the defense-related issues would be both time consum-
ing and similar for each plaintiff.125 Noting that "[n]ecessity moves us to
change and invent," '126 the court was relatively flexible in holding that
the plaintiffs crossed the "threshold of 'commonality' [which] is not
high."1 27
In contrast, the Second Circuit more stringently affirmed Rule 23(b)(3)
certification in In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation .128 In re
Agent Orange involved the liability of several large chemical companies
and the United States for injuries to the armed forces of several nations
and their families allegedly caused by exposure to the herbicide while
serving in Vietnam. 129 After finding commonality, the court held that
class certification was appropriate.130 The court was rather strict, how-
ever, in requiring that both the evidence and the issue pertaining to the
government contractor defense be common to all class members.
13 1
Even when the class lacks commonality as to all of the issues, the court
may, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4)(A), certify class action as to one or more
issues for which commonality exists. 132 This not only increases judicial
120. Id. at 1011.
121. Id. at 1010.
122. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 472.
124. Id. The "state of the art" defense is a claim by the defendants that "at the relevant times
they did not know, nor could have known, of the dangers of their products." In re Asbestos Litig.,
829 F.2d 1233, 1235 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988).
125. 782 F.2d at 472.
126. Id. at 473.
127. Id. at 472. "Judge Parker's plan is clearly superior to the alternative of repeating hundreds
of times over, the litigation of the state of the art issues with, as that experienced judge says 'days of
the same witnesses, exhibits and issues from trial to trial."' Id. at 473.
128. 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
129. Id. at 148.
130. Id.
131. Id. See infra note 151 for an explanation of the government contract defense.
132. See supra note 114.
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economy but may lead to a greater willingness to settle.133 In Jenkins,
the Fifth Circuit found the state of the art defense which the defendants
would raise was common to all class members.1 34 In In re Agent Orange,
the Second Circuit affirmed certification of the class due to the govern-
ment contractor defense, which, once raised, fulfilled the commonality
requirement.' 35 When class certification pertains to a single issue, the
court disposes of the remaining issues peculiar to individual plaintiffs
separately at subsequent trials.'
36
B. Common Issue Predominance
Common issues that constitute a significant part of the individual cases
satisfy the predominance requirement.' 37 In the toxic tort area, the re-
quirement that common issues predominate often is difficult for plaintiffs
to meet. In Brown v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Author-
ity,' 38 a Pennsylvania district court denied class certification on this
ground.39 In Brown, the plaintiffs sought class certification for personal
and economic injuries allegedly due to the defendants' handling, storage,
and use of "PCBs"' at a Pennsylvania railyard.14' The court found
that the causation issues were too individual to merit class action because
the plaintiffs could not single out one set of operative facts to establish
the defendants' liability, because the alleged injuries occurred over a ten-
year period, and because the plaintiffs' circumstances, medical histories,
and injuries varied.' 42 Thus, the individual questions predominated over
the common question.
However, in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,143 the plaintiffs
sought class certification for personal injuries and property damage alleg-
edly due to contaminated water from the defendant's chemical waste
133. Williams, supra note 31.
134. 782 F.2d at 709.
135. 818 F.2d at 678. See infra note 151 for an explanation of the government contractor
defense.
136. Williams, supra note 31, at 327. Subsequent trials would dispose of individual issues con-
cerning, inter alia, causation, compensatory damages, and other affirmative defenses. Id.
137. See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985); In re Asbestos School
Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
138. 1987 WL 9273 (E.D. Pa.) (unpublished opinion).
139. Id.
140. Polychlorinate biphenyl. Id. at 2-3.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 25.
143. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
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burial site."4  The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification. 14 The court
held that class action was appropriate because, despite their differing in-
juries, the causation issues would require the plaintiffs to present substan-
tially the same evidence."14 Consequently, the court found that common
questions of fact predominated over the individual questions.
1 47
Similarly, the Second Circuit consistently has denied defendants' writs
of mandamus in Agent Orange litigation, affirming district court Judge
Weinstein's class certification. 148 In In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals
Co. , 149 the class at issue consisted of several hundred veterans who
served in Vietnam from 1961-1972, their spouses, parents, and chil-
dren. 150 Judge Weinstein had found that the common issues of general
causation, failure to warn, and affirmative defenses predominated, thus
satisfying the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements. 15 The Second Circuit found
many issues peculiar to individual plaintiffs: the nature of exposure, the
causation of individual ailments, and the amount of monetary dam-
ages. "'52 Nonetheless, the court held that it could determine such issues
either in further subclasses or in individual trials.
1 53
C. Class Action as a Superior Method of Adjudication
In cases such as Brown v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority, 54 once the court holds that the class fails to meet the predom-
inance requirement, it usually holds that class action is not the superior
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1197.
147. Id.
148. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
149. 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
150. Id. at 859.
151. Id. at 860. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
The defendants used the government contract defense, claiming that they should be exempt from
liability because the government, aware of Agent Orange's hazards, established the specifications for
its use. The defendants argued that they merely were acting in accordance with government require-
ments. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
152. 725 F.2d at 860.
153. Id. Differences in geography, degree, or time are also problems that generally plague class
certification of mass torts. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1039, 1057 (1986). In Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D.
Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983), the court ordered class certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) for women born in Massachusetts who were exposed to DES in the state and were
domiciled there when they received notice. The court later decertified the class when it became
evident that common questions no longer predominated. 100 F.R.D. at 339.
154. 1987 WL 9273 (E.D. Pa.) (unpublished opinion).
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means of adjudication.155 In Brown, the court found that consolidated
discovery, coordinated motion practices, and the possibility of joint trials
on some of the claims might provide a resolution preferable to class certi-
fication.156 In contrast, when courts hold common questions of law or
fact predominant over individual ones, they sometimes find class action
to be the best means of adjudication in order to avoid a duplication of
evidence and witnesses and to conserve judicial time.15 7
IV. CONGRESS MUST ACT
Although the arguments in favor of mass tort class actions are persua-
sive in terms of necessity, public policy, and judicial economy, they can-
not stand in light of Rule 23(b)(3)'s express commonality requirement.1 58
Try as they might to manage the asbestos litigation overload through
class action, the courts cannot ignore the facts.1 59
It often seems that when judges face difficult decisions or close calls
they "cop out" and, leaving the issue unresolved, call for the legislature
to act. However, the asbestos crisis truly is an area that Congress or the
state legislatures need to address."6
A federal solution is preferable. At a minimum, Congress must pro-
vide procedural legislation to bring some predictability, control, and effi-
ciency to the asbestos arena. Congress should tailor class action
procedures to meet the modem crisis. 6 '
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAMnCE 23.45[2],[3] (2d ed. 1991).
158. See supra notes 101-32.
159. As one authority aptly noted: "[A]ttempts to force nonconforming mass-tort cases into
Rule 23 categories succeed only in a tortured, Procrustean fashion.... [A]dvocating the class action
treatment of mass-tort cases under Rule 23 proves intellectually untidy, and judicial certification in
mass-tort cases amounts to little more than grudging concession to pragmatism." Mullenix, supra
note 153, at 1060 (quoting Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 909 (1984)).
160. "The arguments [for class certification] are compelling, but they are better addressed to the
representative branches-Congress and the State Legislature." In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d
706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990). In an earlier decision, the Fifth Circuit stated:
There is no doubt that a desperate need exists for federal legislation in the field of asbestos
litigation. Congress' silence on the matter, however, hardly authorizes the federal judiciary
to assume for itself the responsibility for formulating what essentially are legislative solu-
tions. Displacement of state law is primarily a decision for Congress, and Congress has yet
to act.
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
161. See Mullenix, supra note 153. Congress has been aware of the need for action to solve at
least one facet of the asbestos litigation problem. Members of Congress have made three proposals-
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Such legislation would relax, if not abolish, the commonality require-
ment. 162 Admittedly an imperfect solution, such a "relaxation" clearly
would be effective. While de-emphasizing commonality might permit
some undeserving plaintiffs to slip through the cracks and recover dam-
ages, the advantages of compensating the many deserving plaintiffs in a
more timely manner outweigh the drawbacks.
Proposing that Congress act in such a manner may seem extraordi-
nary, but extraordinary means are necessary and not unprecedented.
Twice before Congress has tailored Rule 23 to meet specific situations.
Congress enacted Rule 23.1163 to provide for a shareholder derivative
action and Rule 23.2164 to deal with actions relating to unincorporated
none of which passed Congress-to solve the problems that arise when defendants have insufficient
funds to compensate asbestos victims. First, Senator Hart (D-Colo.) proposed a solution in 1980.
Hearings on S. 2847, supra note 12. Hart's proposal would have established a commission to set
minimum standards for state workers' compensation programs regarding asbestos injuries. Under
the proposal, if the state did not fulfill the requirements, a fund would compensate the claimant.
Asbestos manufacturers, the United States Government, and employers would contribute to this
fund. Id.
A year later Representative Fenwick (R-N.J.) proposed a second bill to establish a fund to which
certain individuals and entities would contribute. H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC.
H-9670 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981). Because other non-asbestos substances such as tobacco can cause
lung cancer, one of the three most prevalent asbestos-related diseases, the bill required the tobacco
industry to contribute to the compensation fund as well. 127 CONG. REc. 31639 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
1981) (remarks by Representative Fenwick). See also supra note 16 and accompanying text for a
discussion of lung cancer. Additionally, the bill required manufacturers and importers of asbestos
products to contribute to the fund, although the federal government would not be so required. Id.
Finally, Representative Miller (D-Cal.) proposed a bill to create a similar fund, requiring contri-
butions from asbestos manufacturers, importers, and employees, but not from the federal govern-
ment. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H-3430 (daily ed. 1983). This bill included
compensation not only for asbestos victims, but also for victims of mining diseases. Id. Section 6(c)
of H.R. 3175 would have established three presumptions to enable asbestos claimants to avoid the
problems of establishing causation:
(1) Mesothelioma of the pleura or peritoneum shall be irrebutably presumed to have re-
sulted from exposure to asbestos.
(2) Asbestosis shall be irrebuttably presumed to have resulted from exposure to asbestos.
(3) Cancer of the lung shall be presumed to have resulted from exposure to asbestos. In
any case in which radiological or histological evidence is produced of asbestotic changes to
the lung or pleura, the presumption that the lung cancer resulted from exposure to asbestos
shall be irrebuttable.
Id.
Because some medical evidence contradicts these presumptions, many people have criticized them
as a means to facilitate litigation. Some studies even suggest that, because of the latency period, no
connection exists between exposure to asbestos and mesothelioma and lung cancer. Craighead &
Mossman, supra note Ill. But see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 105-36 and accompanying text.
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.2.
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associations. Just as a shareholder's derivative action contains distinctive
elements which made a new rule appropriate,1 65 so, too, does asbestos
litigation.
166
Congress must address three basic problems. First, what law should
govern? Second, how should the large class be broken down to create a
minimum level of commonality? Finally, how can a court ensure that
the defendant will be solvent in order to compensate even the last
plaintiff?
A. Governing Law
As the Fibreboard court 61 aptly noted, federal class actions involve
Erie Doctrine complications because of different states' liability stan-
dards. 6 ' Choice of law problems not only increase the complexity of
asbestos litigation, but they drive up the cost and duration, as well.169
Uncertainty over which law to apply may also chill prospective settle-
ments.' 70  In order to fairly, efficiently, and uniformly dispose of the
thousands of personal injury asbestos cases, Congress must authorize the
creation of federal common law. 7 ' Because the asbestos litigation has
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 advisory committee's note. As Judge WIlliams has noted: "De-
spite cosmetic differences in appearance and differences in methods of assessing damages, securities
fraud and mass tort actions are indistinguishable in both scope and effect, making the vastly different
fate of the class action in each incongruous." Williams, supra note 31, at 330. Judge Williams
certified a nationwide class of Dalkon Shield plaintiffs under Rule 23(bX1) to determine punitive
damages and a state-wide class under Rule 23(bX3) to determine common issues of liability. In re
Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield, Etc., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1171 (1983). The Ninth Circuit reversed. Id.
166. See supra notes 15-19, 23, 106-13 and accompanying text.
167. In re Fibreboard, 893 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1990).
168. See Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1075-79; Note, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step
Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REv. 1180, 1214 (1983) (several commentators have
proposed the creation of mass tort procedural law to resolve conflict-of-law problems).
169. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1076. Before proceeding to the merits, a federal court must
spend a significant amount of time deciding how to apply state or federal rules. In the worst case
scenario, a court certifies specific issues to the state supreme court, which then takes years to resolve
the issue. See, eg., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1327-29 (5th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (certifying issues concerning damages to the Mississippi Supreme Court).
170. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1076. See also supra notes 39-45 for a discussion of the effects
of case settlement.
171. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1077. But see Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d
at 1326, in which the court was doubtful about establishing a federal common law:
[We note the impracticalities of fashioning a federal common law in the context of asbes-
tos litigation. First, any decision by this court to displace state law would be effective only
within our geographical jurisdiction. While it is of course possible that other circuits
would in time follow our lead, at least one circuit has already expressly refused to apply
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taken on a national scope and dimension, "the interstate judicial system
[has an] interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controver-
sies."' 7 2 Developing a federal common law that addresses the asbestos
crisis is the most effective means of furthering this goal.'73
The proposed legislation would facilitate not only the adjudication of
the current 29,466 federal claims, but also that of the 60,000 state claims
currently pending. 74 Such an enactment would eliminate both the Erie
Doctrine complications'75 and the state law barriers to uniform and effi-
cient resolution of the asbestos claims. 176 Uniform adjudication would
enable the parties to a suit to predict the outcomes and would, conse-
quently, lead to more out-of-court settlements.
Certainly, such settlements are advantageous for all involved. The
courts would become more effective in allocating their time. The plain-
tiffs would receive compensation, and the defendant companies would be
able to both budget their expenditures and save costly attorneys' fees.
Although the best means of coping with the asbestos crisis, establish-
ment of federal common law is not without its drawbacks. Until the
Supreme Court addresses the substance of such federal common law, its
creation would be left to individual circuits. 1 7 7 Unless the Supreme
Court spoke quickly, asbestos claimants might be tempted to forum
shop.178  Congressional enactment of substantive provisions to accom-
pany these recommended procedural guidelines could go a long way to-
wards preventing such initial forum shopping.'7 9
federal common law in these circumstances. Unless and until the Supreme Court imposes
a similar federal common law on the country as a whole, any federal substantive rules
fashioned by us would only exacerbate the alleged inequities among claimants, with puni-
tive and certain types of compensatory damages being available outside the circuit but not
within. Such a result, in turn, would encourage a massive effort at forum shopping to bring
suits outside this circuit.
Id.
172. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield, Etc., 526 F. Supp. 887, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
173. See supra note 171.
174. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1079.
175. See supra note 63 for a discussion of the Erie doctrine.
176. See supra notes 65-67.
177. See supra note 140.
178. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1079.
179. Id. Of course, to the extent Congress did enact such provisions, the law would not be
federal "common law."
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B. The Creation of Minimum Commonality Among Class Members
Since classes in asbestos litigation can become extremely large,8 0 Con-
gress must provide guidelines to break classes into more manageable
numbers. Judge Weinstein's method of handling the Navy Yard cases is
both viable and innovative."81 Congress could allow courts to break
classes down in several different ways: classes could be created on the
basis of illness, by the percentage of injury the plaintiff claims a particu-
lar defendant caused,"8 2 or by the plaintiff's nature as a person directly
exposed to asbestos or that person's relative."8 ' Courts could determine
which plaintiffs fall into each category by providing the plaintiffs with
identical interrogatories. To promote uniformity and fairness, Congress
should set specific guidelines for the questions to be asked.
In addition to subclassing plaintiffs, Congress must provide for class
certification for limited issues and purposes including: settlement, pre-
trial proceedings, liability ascertainment, and punitive damage assess-
ment. "'84 By providing for subclasses based on different factors, a
potential class member will not be forced to give up individual interests
that may entitle him to more than a fellow class member.8 5
C. Defendant Solvency
To ensure that the defendant remains solvent and capable of compen-
sating each deserving plaintiff, Congress must draft its bill to exclude
opting out and, in the case of probable insolvency, to exclude punitive
damages until after a determination that the defendant has compensated
all present and likely future plaintiffs.
In her legislative proposal, Professor Mullenix provides for an "opt-
in/opt-out" device.'8 6 However, a decision by many plaintiffs to pursue
individual causes of action will frustrate the fostering of judicial economy
180. In In re Fibreboard Corp. 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990), the class would have included
3,031 plaintiffs. See supra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. A typical class includes the actual victims of direct exposure to asbestos as well as those
who came into contact with the initial victim's asbestos-laden clothes. See supra notes 106-13 and
accompanying text.
184. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1074.
185. Id. at 1075.
186. Id. at 1070-72. She believes that such a provision strikes an effective balance between judi-
cial economy and the individual plaintiff's interest in controlling his own case. Id. See supra notes
46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the validity of such concerns.
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and uniformity. Professor Mullenix acknowledges this problem and pro-
vides that "opt out relief should be granted only in extraordinary
cases."' 187 However, Congress must act in a clear and definite manner to
address and curb the national asbestos litigation crisis. Drawing lines on
the basis of "extraordinary cases" undermines the needed clarity that the
proposed uniform guidelines will provide. What is an "extraordinary
case" to one court may be ordinary to another. In light of the pressing
need for clarity and as much uniformity as possible,188 such line-drawing
should not be permitted.
To further ensure that the defendant is able to compensate even the
last deserving plaintiff, Congress must circumscribe punitive damages
awards. Once a class succeeds on the merits, punitive damages may be
assessed, but the court should distribute actual and compensatory dam-
ages first. Distribution should be on a pro rata basis with plaintiffs suffer-
ing from more serious illnesses receiving their share first.189 Second,
elderly class members should be compensated to ensure that they enjoy
some remuneration during their lifetimes. Finally, the class members
suffering from less serious injuries should recover their share. Congress
must provide for the establishment of trusts to take into account future
plaintiffs.19 It is only once the defendant compensates all present and
ascertainable future plaintiffs that the plaintiffs should receive punitive
damages. Otherwise, earlier plaintiffs may receive substantially more
than equally deserving later class members.
V. CONCLUSION
"Asbestos litigation has become the classic example of civil cases that
cost too much and take too long."1 '' It is inundating our courts, making
prompt adjudication increasingly difficult. Although several district
court judges have devised innovative means to curb the crisis, they are
invariably reversed on appeal. No one questions the dire need for some
way to adjudicate asbestos claims effectively and fairly. However, noth-
ing seems to work. Even class action under Rule 23(b)(3), although at-
187. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 1073. She believes that Congress can discourage opting out by
requiring court permission to do so and by structuring lawyer's fees to encourage joinder. Id.
188. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 42-43.
190. Due to the latent nature of asbestos-related illnesses, potential plaintiffs might not discover
their illnesses prior to adjudication. See supra notes 15-17, 23 and accompanying text.
191. In re National Asbestos Litig., Cleveland Div., 1-90 Cv 11,000 (Aug. 10, 1990).
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tractive, is inappropriate because the typical asbestos class cannot meet
the commonality requirement.
In order to relieve our overly-burdened courts, Congress, acting in a
clear and precise manner, must provide for a class action device geared
solely towards asbestos litigation. To promote judicial economy, uni-
formity, and predictability, Congress must authorize federal common
law. To ensure manageability, Congress must mandate the creation of
specific subclasses according to injury, percentage of injury, or the type
of potential class members involved. Finally, to ensure adequate com-
pensation to successful class litigants, Congress must reject an opt out
device while structuring a hierarchy of compensation, providing for the
most seriously injured first and reserving punitive damages awards until
the court is fairly certain that the defendant has compensated the last
plaintiff.
For years, courts have been crying out for Congressional action. Now
is the time for Congress to heed these cries and to put an end to the
national asbestos litigation crisis.
Patricia Zimand
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